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Abstract: In this article, I argue that the singularization of the 
artistic discourse in the 15th century encouraged philosophers 
in the 18th century to conceptualize on the aesthetic experi-
ence, taking it as a distinct kind of common experience. The 
description of this experience, as being one that is disinter-
ested and lacks purpose, led to the progressive consolida-
tion of an autonomous art, that is free from social contracts 
and takes refuge in museums. These have developed their 
physical space in accordance to this definitive presupposition. 
If, in contrast, we understand aesthetic experience as any 
complete experience, as Dewey sustains, our understanding 
of art and its institutions will be different.
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For Dewey, who roughly defines it as any complete experience, 
the aesthetic experience would not be a different type, detached 
from all others. Thus, any and all experience lived in its fullness 
by a person will be aesthetic. Art, being summarily experience 
as experience, occupies a privileged and exemplary place in 
its theory.1 The first attempts to conceptualize and describe a 
certain kind of singular knowledge by its sensitive characteristics 
date back to the first half of the 18th century with Baumgarten, 
the founder of the philosophical discipline known as Aesthetics, 
whose reflections would have as their object the sensations, the 
perceptions and, above all, the beauty, in nature and in art.2 ut, 
it was with Kant that the conceptualization of experience gained 
perhaps its most consequential form, reaching the present day.3 
The author argues that the judgment of taste, being sensitive, 
is aesthetic because, without concept and purpose, it is 
anchored solely in the experience of pleasure and displeasure 
of the subject in the object. However, going further, the author 
confers on the individual, who carries it out, the intellectual and 
distanced attitude, founded on the free games of imagination 
1. DEWEY, J. Art comme expérience. Pau : Farago, 2005
2. BAUMGARTEN, A. G. Esthétique. Paris: Bibliothèque de philosophie et 
d'esthétique, 1988
3. KANT, I. Crítica da faculdade de julgar. Rio de Janeiro: Forense Universitária, 
1993.
and understanding. The judgment of taste, of a qualitative 
nature because it manifests directly in the spirit, differs from 
the quantitative sensations of the pleasant and the delightful 
which, based on the natural appetites, have the purpose of 
immediate corporal satiation. Kant recognizes that the beautiful, 
having its foundation in the mental representation that each 
individual makes of the object, is subjective at the same time 
that it is universally communicable,  because it is transcendent: 
whoever judges, even if in total interiority, puts himself in the 
shoes of another. An affirmation that distances him from his 
contemporaries who saw in the rules and standards the condition 
for the sensitive discernment and justification of taste.4
Objects Of Art And technicAl Objects
Although the authors early recognize that aesthetic 
experience relates to the unlimited number of mundane 
objects, regardless of whether they are artistic, natural or 
simple artifacts, the substrate and the genesis of reflection 
are intrinsically linked to the emergence of art in history 
and the consequent implications it will maintain with the 
beauty and its controversies. Indeed, the facts lead us to 
believe that the discussions on taste, which we have seen 
arise in Aesthetics involving objectivity and subjectivity, can 
be traced back to the different treaties that, since the 15th 
century, revolve around art and its foundations. It would 
be possible, therefore, to raise the hypothesis that the 
singularization of the artistic practice as an activity focused 
on the forms of beauty — including the intrinsic relations it 
maintains with those of ugliness — has initially encouraged 
philosophers to conceptualize on aesthetic experience in all 
extensions. But, having in art its referential model, the very 
conviction of the philosophy that it was a singular experience, 
unlike the trivial ones, came to influence simultaneously 
the conception of an autonomous art which, in order to 
satisfy the full disinterestedness of experience, had to 
first invent the mechanisms of neutralization that isolated 
it from the world. The museum and its display modes are 
sympathetic of this principle. Gradually, the "disinterested" 
characteristic of experience was transferred to the object, 
4. This, for example, is the view of Hume: “Do padrão do gosto”. In: Hume. São 
Paulo : Nova Cultural, p.333-350. (Col. Os Pensadores)
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whose meaning, at least ideally, took refuge within the self-
sufficient form, abstractionism being, perhaps, the most 
complete expression of this ideology. As result, the world 
of artifacts has been divided in two: on one hand, objects 
of art with pretension to the expression of pure ideas and 
feelings observed in their constitutive material aspects: form, 
color, texture; on the other hand, the technical, serving the 
instrumental application and the utilitarianism to which they 
were assigned. The same can be said of the professional 
activities that accompany them: artists on one side; on the 
other, designers. All the fallacious difficulty we face, for 
example, in assuming architecture as art, comes from this 
dramatic and somewhat misguided separation. Difficulties 
that have led experienced authors like Argan to conclude:
[...] Let us take the case of a railway station. If I am running 
for a train that is leaving, I will appreciate the rationality of 
the route, the comfort of the services, the ease of access 
to the wagons of the level platforms; but I won't have time 
to evaluate the aesthetic quality of the architecture. It may 
happen that I think about it later, in the peace of the train 
cabin. So, perhaps the images that impressed my retina as 
I ran to the wagon and that my memory retained, without 
my willingness, can come back to my mind, and I will have 
the possibility to look at them and evaluate them, that is, to 
remember that the station was architecturally excellent and it 
was a pity that I couldn't see it better.5
Argan seems to have been victim to the common sense 
trap, believing that when we use the object in a utilitarian 
manner we face a technical or functional experience, but 
putting ourselves at a distance to appreciate it in its sensitive 
manifestations — to him, those who impress the retina — we 
will be involved in an authentic aesthetic experience. On the 
other hand, if alongside Dewey we accept that all complete 
experience is aesthetic, this distinction does not resonate. 
Moreover, in such situation, all the senses — not just the 
vision — would be attentive and invested in the experience.
relAtive beAuty And AbsOlute beAuty
Belting, in his book Le chef-œuvre invisible,6 identifies two 
regimes of "masterpieces". One pre-modern, that goes from 
the Renaissance to the 18th century, founded in the rules of 
the art; and another, that comes from the romantic theories, 
5. ARGAN. G. C. História da arte como história da cidade. São Paulo: Martins 
Fontes, 2005. p.229
6. Le chef-œuvre invisible. Nîmes : Jacqueline Chambron, 2003.
inaugurating a certain modern practice that persecutes, in its 
successive failed accomplishments, the general idea of art. 
They can be translated by the concepts of relative and absolute 
beauty, that pointed out the quarrels around the creation of 
museums and their collections in the early 19th century.
The relative beauty has as reference the finished and 
unique objects that Greco-Roman antiquity bequeathed to 
modern society as examples of the maximum limit of the 
human capacity to achieve perfection. Its limit is the precise 
application of the rules in the object. Its condition is the learn-
ing of the art which, until the end of the 16th century, was 
created in the atelier of artists and, later, in the academies 
through systematized and equally theoretical instruction. 
Indeed, the appreciation of taste rested with the specialist 
who, knowing the rules of Fine Arts, could evaluate and 
justify if they were well applied in the object. The master-
piece, in measure and conformity to the rules, is the private 
work of art which, revealing the mastery of the artist, met 
the expectations of the métier. Being the relative beauty 
susceptible of being designated in the object, it made not 
only effective proof of culmination, but it also represented 
the moment of public recognition of the artist's career. For 
its perfection, the masterpiece was an example worthy of 
being presented in museums and playing a prominent role 
in the history of art. 
From the appreciation of the same masterpieces of 
antiquity, but following another path for understanding, the 
absolute beauty will completely modify the notion of art. 
First appearing in romantic circles, it is sympathetic to the 
concept of genius. The beauty observed in the exemplary 
works surpasses, in its perfection, the rules. It touches the 
heart in a way so surprising and profound that it cannot even 
be described in its objectivity without being betrayed in its 
spiritual essence, unrepresentable by itself. This instan-
taneous rapture of the spirit is caused by the instance of 
the absolute embodied in the matter formed by the artist. 
The effect of something else, that only the genius can 
confer. No learning, no a priori rule can, therefore, access 
it. The notion of the ineffable absolute will definitely affect 
much of the 19th and 20th century art, according to Belting. 
It can be observed in different shades in the practices of 
Cézanne, Van Gogh, Matisse, Picasso and, of course, of 
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all symbolists, but also in the different universalist utopias 
pervading some of the historical vanguards. Disregarding 
the dogmatic rules learned in the academies, the artistic 
work is fruit of the inspiration of the solitary individual who, 
solitary in his atelier, pursues the ultimate realization that 
reveals to him the true face of the absolute. A work that, from 
the singular act of creation, makes emerge from itself, rather 
than the essence of art, the essence of the human being, 
the ultimate conclusion. This time, the absolute beauty will 
be, for the one who pursues it, an idea of art that, due to its 
immaterial condition, is only expressed partially and imper-
fectly in the object. More important than the results found in 
particular, incomplete, unfinished, partial and unsatisfactory 
cases, is the, always delayed, ultimate enunciation program 
of art that feeds the practice, but that is not fulfilled and 
could not be effectively fulfilled in the object. All that matters 
is the idea. The cult of the absolute, replacing that of art, 
conformed to the rules, gains prominence in the feeling of 
the sublime and in its consequent subjective anchorages 
and incommensurability. Different theories of modern art 
may be summoned as a testimony to such ambition, but it is 
enough to recall here about Malevitch's prophetic writings, 
one of the most acute in these terms. In the Suprematist 
Manifesto, the artist emphatically evokes the aesthetics of 
the future through a threshold practice in painting/architec-
ture, whose zero degree of reference appeals, in contrast, 
to the alleged feeling of the absolute, beyond which nothing 
would reside, nor subject, nor any particular object, besides 
the eloquent and mute being of art.7
the burden Of A pArticulAr experience
Controversies over whether museums should only collect 
masterpieces or whether, on the contrary, they should privilege 
the history of art, gathering both tentative and experimental 
misadventures as well as culminations of success, marked its 
creation in the early 19th century. However, this discussion is not 
relevant to the purposes we intend to pursue. The fact is that 
the changes introduced in the understanding of masterpiece in 
Romanticism, going along with the philosophical conceptions on 
the singularity of the aesthetic experience, had consequences 
7. Kasemir Malevitch. Suprematismo. In: Chipp, H. B. . Teorias da arte moderna. 
São Paulo : Martins Fontes, 1993. (p.345-351).
that fundamentally affected our relation with art. Firstly, the 
exercise of criticism, based on the principle of subjective 
judgment, is no longer based on rules, but on the agreement of 
feelings shared with the artist, it becomes rhetorical. Indeed, the 
poetic use of language in art criticism has artistic value parallel 
to that of the work. For that reason, it will be practiced in a more 
elaborated way by literati, in the brochures accompanying the 
exhibitions or in the newspapers of great circulation at the time. 
Secondly, it is no longer confined to the circle of the connaisseur, 
nor even to that of the cultured man, it is accessible to all ordinary 
people who have an opinion. The general public attending the 
halls can now exercise their judgment, expressing their taste 
and preference. Thirdly, because of the type of experience, the 
exhibition spaces, more precisely the museums, were gradually 
adapted and conformed to a specific demand that asked each 
of the visitors, a particular spectator who appreciates the work, 
for a secret communion with the artist's feelings. In the attitude 
of recollection that the haughty moment of the commotion 
demands, the silence accompanies the introspective reflection 
of the subject within himself and by facing the object. Everything 
in the exhibition space, from the lighting directed to the neutrality 
of the decoration, will be, throughout the history of the museum 
reaching our days, improved to intensify the experience 
of distancing that one lives in it, being the "white cube" its 
most finished expression. Fourthly, the objects themselves 
decontextualized from the mundane contracts, isolated in the 
ideal atmosphere that surround and configure them, close 
themselves in their autonomy only to accentuate the aesthetic 
properties that seek no other end, but the abstract and general 
instance of form, the highest on because there’s no applicability. 
Out of the time and the social uses that justified them, they have 
as a new scenario the very history of art. Finally, in the silage 
of the typification of the experience, the places of the artist and 
the public are also specialized. If it is up to the genius artist, 
and only to him, the work of creation; to the public, who all of 
us are, including the artist, is reserved the appreciation of the 
work — the experience and the consequent judgment of taste. 
Certainly, the understanding of aesthetic experience as specific 
has, by unexpected means, perpetuated the worship of the 
sacred images of the Middle Ages in the object of modern art. 
It contributed to its condition of fetish merchandise, obliterating 
in part its cultural rootedness, whose human value, in contrast, 
is inestimable. The artist, in turn, when absorbed by the market, 
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often tends to behave like a star of a world of glamour and futilities 
that Warhol very well joked about in the prophetic "15 minutes of 
fame". To admit that art is inexorably drawn by the parameters 
of the market is to accept that the market drains out the work 
of all human content, thereby reducing aesthetic experience to 
the slight buzz from the tourism industry, the flattery of good 
taste and the money that affect the world of art. An inevitable 
reality? Moreover, would such a conclusion mean that we must 
dismantle museums and clear them from their collections?
A cOmplete experience Of Any Kind
In a different way, Dewey considers that the tout court 
experience comes from the interactions between man and 
nature, and yet, it is of the same order as the aesthetic 
experience. For the author, in the course of any experience 
brought to fruition in the relations with the outside world, 
"[...] the human energy, initially immobilized, is successively 
released and restrained, frustrated and victorious, following 
the rhythmic alternation of necessity and satisfaction, from 
the drives of free action and the constrained action. "8 If the 
term sense carries in itself a polysemy of meanings such as 
sensation, sensorial, sentimental, and sensual, for example, 
integrated so directly and intrinsically in the experience by 
experience, "it designates the function of the sensory organs 
when fully exercising this function."9 In fact, "the experience 
is the result, the sign, and the reward for the interaction 
between the organism and the environment which, at 
the moment it is brought to its end, is a transformation of 
interaction into participation and communication."10 The 
"participation" is, therefore,  the act of realization or, if we 
may, production in process that encompasses all experience 
and without which it could not come to fruition. If, in its turn, 
the work of art is a experience as experience, it has the 
8. "Dans ces interactions, l’énergie humaine d’abord mobilisée, est successivement 
libérée et endiguée, frustrée et victorieuse, suivant l’alternance rythmique du 
besoin et de la satisfaction, des pulsations de l’action libre et celles de l’action 
contrariée." (Dewey, 2005, p.35)
9. "Le terme de “sens” recouvre une vaste gamme de contenus [...]. Mais le sens, 
en tant que signification incarnée d’une manière si directe dans l’expérience 
qu’elle se signifique elle-même de façon lumineuse, est le seul terme que designe 
la funcicion des organes des sens lorqu’ils exercent pleinement cette function." 
(idem. p.43)
10. “L’expérience est le résultat, le signe, et la recompense de cette interaction 
entre l’organisme et l’environnement qui, lorsqu’elle est menée à son terme, 
est une transformation de l’interaction en participation et en communication.” 
(ibdem. p.43)
capacity to awake in us what is specifically precious in the 
things that daily give us pleasure, but that were previously 
asleep by the conceptual walls that separate art from life. 
So, the aesthetic experience as any experience is in a 
condition to "restore continuity between these refined and 
more intense forms of experience, which are works of art 
with day-to-day actions, sufferings and events [...].11
If we are prepared to accept the aesthetic experience as 
any other of suffering and pleasure, reflection and action, in 
which unified body and spirit are engaged in their interactions 
with the world in the deepest consequences, the conclusions 
will certainly be different from what we have previously crit-
icized. Thus, not only objects of a technical or artistic, func-
tional or metaphorical nature, do not distinguish themselves 
a priori, the subject is not required to take a certain attitude 
of detachment, but to incorporate in the experience that he 
undertakes the practical as well as the symbolic functions 
of the object. As long as the effort is to undertake an expe-
rience, not even the judgment that can be made, if there’s 
room for it, can not be rationally separated from what in the 
object would be the moral part of what would only be up to 
its sensible qualities. Subject and object form a single entity 
integrated in the complexity of experience. Consequently, we 
will be prepared to accept all kinds of art, whether it is the 
universe that includes only metaphorical, erudite and popu-
lar objects, or those that open to other uses, including those 
of a social purpose, such as architecture, for example. 
Now, it is worth taking some time down this path, for it 
indicates the passage to a much broader and more gener-
ous understanding, which, in taking architecture as a place 
of aesthetic experience, does not distinguish it only from the 
angle of formal qualities. Qualities, in fact, very characteristic 
of the "great monument", that demands to be appreciated with 
detachment, regardless of the functional effectiveness and any 
social and cultural practice that it entails. It is like if the art of 
architecture could be reduced to simple dramatic plays between 
shadow and light, full and empty. Now, when we use it, we know 
very well that "art" is related to the profound experience of life 
that architecture is able to provide in all its extensions.
11. “il s’agit de restaurer cette continuité entre ces formes raffinées et plus intense 
d’experiênce que sont les œuvres d’art et les actions, souffrances, et événements 
quotidiens universellements reconnus comme des éléments constitutifs de 
l’expérience.” (Ibdem., p.21-22)
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Going from architecture to the urban space, under-
standing the city as a "work of art", this is undoubtedly the 
collective artifact whose artistic sense does not lie only in 
isolated and monumental examples, on this or that person-
alistic object punctuating the landscape, but precisely in 
the relationship established, including from empty spaces, 
with other vernacular buildings and the forms of life they 
house. A social and political landscape that man, reference 
in scale and measure, appears as the main motivator and 
transforming agent. The quality of the urban space, consid-
ering the situations of user-friendliness and public exposure 
it promotes, undoubtedly reflects the quality of life of the 
user and citizen. The enriching experience that a seething 
City provides is not separated, so the comfort nor the forms 
of beauty that she welcomes in its visceral contradictions. 
A wide and well-drawn sidewalk, where one can walk with 
ease as much as the diversity of human types that intersect 
and crumble there, in the same way as the flowery garden or 
the shade of a tree under which it takes shelter to cool of the 
heat, everything is part of the art and integrates the aesthetic 
experience that is lived in the city. The slums, for example, 
that we see erupt all over the world where the social and 
economic imbalance is remarkable, are not environments 
that degrade man by its chaotic nature. Battered and contin-
ually neglected by the public power, they became the stage 
for violence outside acceptable standards. If they receive 
the necessary social investments that enhance the particular 
scope of the space and the way of life they shelters, they 
can, undoubtedly, become dignified and resourceful places 
for the full blooming of the human being.
Going back to the small architecture that welcomes 
the domestic life in its interior, we can understand that the 
aesthetic experience that it provides cannot be measured 
by separating, on one hand, the functional performance and 
environmental comfort and, on the other, artistic qualities of 
the form, as if they were different things. In the same way 
as in architecture, art is not in contradiction with technique 
or with the purposes, the objects of art in general (all other 
objects of art) can unambiguously exercise practical func-
tions in society without entailing incongruities or corruption 
of experience. Countless practices by artists of nowadays 
have advanced in this direction. Let us recall certain works 
by Hans Haacke whose critical leitmotiv points to the unscru-
pulous associations of the State with real estate companies, 
which remodel the city according to the interests of the 
speculative capital.12
Finally, I would like to point out that art as experience rela-
tivizes the rigid boundaries that have been erected between 
the artist's activities and that of the public. Implicated in 
experience, these entities, in different ways, often alternate 
themselves in creative and contemplative roles. The terms 
public and spectator, if still employed in the 1960s with some 
hesitation, no longer echo stricto sensu in many of the artis-
tic initiatives of our day. In the spectator/work interaction in 
process, as pointed out previously, the act of participation also 
becomes the the engine of the production of experience. On 
the other hand, the idea of an artistic practice that interiorises 
the reflection gives the artist the moment of contemplation 
and judgment previously attributed to the public.13 This situ-
ation certainly does not compromise the artist's activity, but, 
by shifting it, increases its social reach. The museum, in turn, 
is undoubtedly a place that can enhance this experience by 
giving us the chance to place ourselves fully in the center of 
the arrangements of the story it displays.
experience in trAnsit
For Marcel Duchamp, the power of every work lies in the 
force of the contingencies brought by the coefficient 
of art: "the arithmetical relation between what remains 
unexpressed, although intentional, and what is expressed 
unintentionally",14  opening the path to the participation of the 
public in the process of creation. The "work" as experience 
begins with the artist and ends in the other. In that case, the 
notion of participation does not necessarily have anything to 
do with the subject/object physical interaction as it is usually 
understood, but, above all, with the form of activation of 
the gaze, in fact, an intentionality that, in return, voluntarily 
appropriates the thing as a work of art. The ready-made itself 
becomes the appropriate gesture of the artist who, removing 
12. Pierre Bourdieu et Hans Haacke. Libre échange. Paris : Seuil, 1994.
13. On this subject, see: “Artista e receptor, fronteiras amolecidas no ato 
fotográfico”. (Luciano Vinhosa. Obra de arte e experiência estética, arte 
contemporânea em questões. Rio de Janeiro: Apicuri, 2010.
14. Marcel Duchamp (1965). In: Battcok, Gregory. A nova arte. São Paulo : 
Perspectiva, 1975, p.73.
166 Luciano Vinhosa Simão: Artistic practice and human experience 
the object from its original context, simply and without any 
aesthetic criteria, reinserts it into another frame of things, a 
new set of arrangements in order to add or subtract a layer 
or layers of suppositions, without overriding, nevertheless, 
those that it already carried. This creates a kind of ordinary/
extraordinary tension, which is insinuated as sense gaps, 
opening up to the coefficient of art. In the gaps, inadvertently left 
by the artist's intention, the consequences are unforeseeable 
and the amount of digressions that are practiced and added to 
the previously inert and mute object finally make it a collective 
work of art, bringing together, in its heterogeneous plot, the 
successive interpretations, controversies and commotions, 
such as the opening seen by Duchamp.
The density of tessituras that the work of art adds is 
certainly the fruit of the living history of the object of which 
belong not only the history of the work in art, but of its 
history in the life of any other. The activation of the work 
on a personal history gives the subject the counterpart of 
inscribing himself in the common history when the individual 
experience returns, in the form of action in the world, to the 
center of his personal relations, reshaping his daily attitudes. 
The transition from the individual to the collective is what 
makes the experience with the work so fundamental from 
the human point of view. In return, the object of experience 
itself, the work of art, has its value intrinsically recognized 
because of its inscription so deep in the common ballast of 
the social body, even in the case of apparently trivial objects 
like the ready-mades. Although we are historical subjects, 
we will be also and reciprocally effect and cause of these 
objects, since we are constructed as such from the experi-
ences with them. In this sense, every work of art that is worth 
the qualitative is done collectively and publicly.
One step further
The initiatives of Minimalism, when it rejects the autonomous 
object enclosed in its interior, in favor of an expansion of the 
sculpture in the environment, seems to put the problem in 
another way, but that is equally fundamental. Michael Fried, 
in the text Art and objecthood, first published in Artforum in 
1967,15 argues that certain works by Donald Judd, Robert 
15. No Brasil: Arte e objetidade. In: Arte & Ensaios, n 9. Rio de Janeiro: PPGAV/
EBA/UFRJ.
Morris and Tony Smith, for example, were no longer modern 
art because they affirmed their presence in the space-time in a 
long, discontinuous and incomplete way, thus counteracting the 
foundation of a "continuous and entire presence" observed in 
modernist works of art. He denounces, through a critical reading 
of the texts and testimonies from some artists involved, especially 
those of Judd and those of Morris, the objectivity character of the 
minimalist works. Quality that, he observes, positions the viewer 
in a relational, and therefore relative, spatial condition within an 
temporally experienced open scene. Thus, the neither paintings/
nor sculptures hybrids from Judd, for instance, constituting 
themselves as wholes without parts, are presented as hollow 
objects which, instead of projecting an interior space where the 
parts usually articulate in favor of a closed and cohesive structure 
in formal content, are revealed as anthropomorphic presences 
in the specific place in which they are installed, insinuating 
themselves in the game of expressive possibilities that opens 
in the space, but that depends on the body of the visitor to be 
activated. Fried denounces such arrangements as theatrical, a 
quality he considers premodern not only by conceiving objects 
outside a definite genre — neither painting nor sculpture — but 
because he identifies them with a certain anecdotal practice of 
painting from the 18th century, whose characters addressed the 
audience seeking complicity, as if they were in an open scene. In 
this case, the representation, instead of being firmly structured 
around a cohesive narrative core situated within it, absorbing the 
characters and causing them to bend over themselves, loosely 
leaps out of the picture and dissipates in the environment in 
which the speactator is. Participation and dispersion seem to 
be the predicative that the critic brings together in the common 
term theatricality to conceptually cross the two distinct and distant 
practices historically.
The specific objects of Judd, thought to be modular 
units arranged at regular intervals in space (walls or floor), 
by virtue of the constant, simple and whole form that each 
of them contemplates in isolation, induces the view into the 
whole. In effect, they capture into the series the negative 
voids that remain between them. Such a set of objects, 
ceasing to have an intrinsic content, invites the spectator to 
have an integrated architectural experience. Certain modu-
lar sequences have light that goes through them, due to the 
transparency of the material with which they were made, 
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radiating their color in the surroundings. Others, assert the 
voids that can be crossed by the bodies and are assembled 
by the visitor in the articulated whole of space, temporarily 
modifying the architecture. Morris, in turn, by launching his 
serial structures in space, in different directions and senses, 
creates an open perception of the whole, a dramatic space 
that constantly rearranges itself according to the spectator's 
point of view. Fried's criticisms, although negative, give a 
better understanding of what minimalist artists seek when 
they want their work to be lived as things that are: the mate-
rial, the color, the weight, the scale, the game of spatial moti-
vations in articulation with architecture. In the experience they 
provide, any content that may be separated from the space/
time lived is, therefore, out of the question. Minimalists are one 
step closer to affirm the aesthetic experience as use. 
Outside the usual Western axis of art — Europe/United 
States — other important advancements, but following 
different paths, are competing for the same approach. The 
initiatives of Lygia Clark, coming from Mondrian's questions 
about an art projecting into the real space of the spectator, 
reached conceptual independence in the 1960s when they 
took off from a strictly plastic posture to embark on a synaes-
thetic adventure. In works such as sensorial masks, smells, 
textures and sounds summon the sensorial organs to inte-
grate themselves in the experience of psychological immer-
sion that they promote. Subsequently, Clark's experiences 
with relational objects in therapeutic context, which, accord-
ing to the artist, gain substance only when they are used by 
the subject, end up by far surpassing the expectations from 
only the field of art. However, her proposal maintains the 
internal coherence that is expected from an enlarged work 
invested with human content. 
In our days, by the urging of Duchamp, Lygia, Kaprow, 
Beuys and many others, different artistic practices are char-
acterized by such open and distinct forms of participation that 
the term public, in some sort, would not be easily applied. It 
would be the case, for example, of those so-called relational 
or artistic propositions whose emphasis falls on the collec-
tive experience it promotes. However, we can still see the 
artist as the one who elaborates a work whose destination 
must always be public.
the Artist in fAce Of the experience Of the wOrK
The participation in its different nuances of commitment with the 
subject changed not only the notion of work but deeply affected 
the artistic practice from at least the 1960’s. Still, we can say 
that in a sense, the work that predicates "art" emphasizes the 
human content, always so sympathetic to the activity of the artist. 
Certainly, this content is no longer characterized in conformation 
to the rules of the métier, as we could observe in the masterpiece 
of once. Although somehow invisible, it is not in the general and 
ineffable idea of art that could only be imperfectly and partially 
revealed in the object through the genius, or in the emphatic 
affirmation of the artist's 'I'. In today's practice, the effort to gather, 
in any interaction with the world, the seemingly dispersed and 
unprincipled material, under a principle of art, thus endowing 
it with an ethical dimension. The multiple senses that the work 
opens with the participation point to the construction of a common 
experience, more intense and refined, in attention to the things, 
which would seem insignificant, were it not for the human content 
of which they are invested.
The gift of the artist is then only the exemplary legacy of 
the work invested in the work of art.16 A creative power that 
particularizes it as a subject, but which insinuates itself into 
another as possibilities of mutual deepening thanks to the 
shared experience it induces. Its purposes and justification 
are the very condition in which we see ourselves as historical 
subjects. We are led by it to recognize our limits and possibil-
ities for transformation.
the humAn turnArOud
If we recall here certain artifacts of the Neolithic — the delicate 
Venus figurines of fertility, for example — we can more clearly 
understand the force of human expression that they emanate. 
Emerging from a hazy time, unearthed from prehistoric and long-
decontextualized sites, it would't make any sense to measure 
their value in the market as we do today when we speak of a 
well-rated artist at international auctions. To our contemporary 
eyes, stripped of all divine and supernatural connection which 
they would hold, these anonymous objects show only man's 
16. Regarding the gift in art, Jacinto Lageira develops an interesting reflection 
in the article titled “O valor estético do dom”. (In: Vinhosa, Luciano ; D’Angelo, 
Martha. Interlocuções: estética, produção e crítica de arte.  Rio de Janeiro: Apicuri, 
2012. p.89-103)
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investment in the work. Observed in works of art, human content 
at the same time that is is the attribute of a particular man, the 
artist, is also of man in general — the trace of his humanity. In 
this sense, the artistic activity resembles all the others that imply 
the for search motivated simply by the restlessness of man 
towards himself. Artistic qualities, for instance, can be observed 
in scientific or philosophical works motivated by the gratuitous 
and disinterested obstinacy of knowledge about the origin of the 
planet, about the emergence of the species, about the existence 
of life in other solar systems, about the universe.
We make art because we are human, it is a fatality of the 
species. Certainly the most prominent feature of this activity is 
the gratuitousness of experience. The thicker the human layer is 
resented in the work, the more relevant it will be to us. A fact that 
undoubtedly refers back to its quality. Here, both amateur and 
professional work resemble each other. Its consequences in the 
culture will depend, however, on the access to the circuits of visi-
bilities and appreciation that one and the other will have. As an 
example, we can cite the case of Bispo do Rosário, a visionary 
who never claimed for himself the status of artist, who stubbornly 
developed his work in a madhouse in Rio de Janeiro, far from the 
spotlight of professional art. Whether considered art or not, his 
legacy is now a reference for a whole new generation of artists, 
his work is present in the main international events of the genre.17 
In the end, the human content is all [or just] what remains for our 
perplexity. This is where lies all the need, the depth, maybe all the 
"superficiality" of art. The experience with it amazes us because it 
reflects us, for good or all evil, as long as it is complete.
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